The Design Partnership

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (CPTED) REPORT

CORE AND CLUSTER
10A Park Street East Maitland

May 2023

Housing Plus

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN (CPTED) REPORT
CORE AND CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT
10A Park Street East Maitland NSW 2323

PROJECT NUMBER: 24.005

PREPARED BY

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Quality Control Plan

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1 INTRODUCTION

The Design Partnership has been engaged by Housing Plus to prepare a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) Report for a "Core and Cluster" development in Park Street in East Maitland in New South Wales.

This report provides an assessment, analysis and recommendations for the design produced for the development.

1.1 What Is CPTED?

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a strategy that aims to reduce crime by designing the built environment according to a set of guidelines.

CPTED is based on the principle that many offenders are guided by rational thought and make a cost/benefit analysis of their actions prior to committing a crime. Applying CPTED methods aims to discourage offenders by maximising the risk and effort of committing a crime, while minimising the benefits and opportunities of committing that crime.

CPTED also identifies ways to create a feeling of safety, leading to increased use of an area, which in turn improves natural surveillance and deters offenders.

In NSW, CPTED is largely administered by Safer By Design, a co-operative made up of NSW Police, local councils, government departments and private sector organisations. The Design Partnership structures its CPTED reports according to Safer By Design guidelines.

Safer By Design identifies seven key areas where CPTED principles can be applied: surveillance; lighting/technical supervision; territorial reinforcement; environmental maintenance; activity and space management; access control; design/definition/designation.

1.2 Scope & Methodology

The scope of this project is an assessment of the proposed "Core and Cluster" development at Park Street, East Maitland (The Development). The "Core and Cluster" model allows for independent living while providing access to support for victims of domestic violence. The plans have been prepared by Housing Plus and this CPTED Report will form part of a Development Application. This report is authored by Kristine Cianci (Ryan) of The Design Partnership who undertook CPTED training with the NSW Police. Kristine is a registered architect (ARB NSW No. 9254) and specialises in the preparation of CPTED assessments, studies and reports.

The following Methodology was used to prepare the CPTED report:

1. Desktop review of the design.
2. Review of crime data available through the Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research (BOCSAR).
3. Workshop with project team 17 April 2024.
4. Site visit 9 May 2024.
5. Review of media and similar publications.
6. Email discussions with project manager.
7. Preparation of draft CPTED Report.
8. Preparation of final CPTED Report for lodgement with Council with the Development Application.

1.3 Structure Of The Report

The basis of this report is a Crime Risk Assessment (CRA), which is used to identify overall crime risk for the project and the appropriate level of CPTED treatments. A summary of the Crime Risk Assessment has been provided as diagrams in Section 4. Using the CRA as a template, this report assesses the design and provides recommendations under the seven CPTED design principles.

2 THE WIDER CONTEXT

2.1 The Context of East Maitland

East Maitland is a suburb in the Maitland Council Local Government Area (LGA), just south of Maitland's central business district (CBD). The suburb lies along the New England Highway, providing a strategic transportation and commercial activity corridor.

East Maitland features a diverse blend of retail, commercial, and low-density residential areas. The Green Hills shopping centre is at the southern edge of the suburb, a major retail hub serving the community. The commercial district along the New England Highway comprises a mix of single-story commercial and retail buildings interspersed with low-density residential properties, giving the area a unique character.

The suburb is well-connected by public transport, with two train stations: East Maitland in the north and Victoria Street in the south. East Maitland Station is likely to be a key transport hub for residents of the "Core and Cluster," in addition to the bus services along the New England Highway. These transport links offer convenient options for commuting and accessing other parts of the region. East Maitland is one of the oldest suburbs in the Maitland Council Local Government Area (LGA) and has a rich historical context. It's home to several heritage-listed sites and buildings, including the historic Maitland Gaol and the East Maitland Courthouse, contributing to the suburb's character and cultural significance.

East Maitland offers a range of schooling options, with several primary and secondary schools serving the local community. Recreation is another key aspect of East Maitland's context. The suburb has a variety of parks and open spaces, providing residents with opportunities for outdoor activities and community events. The presence of the Hunter River to the north offers additional recreational and scenic value.



Figure 1: East Maitland, located east of Maitland on the New England Highway. (ArcGIS 2024 /TDP 2024)



Figure 2: The subject site within East Maitland (ArcGIS 2024/ TDP 2024)
The site is located west of the New England Highway, the rail line and East Maitland and Victoria Street train stations.

2.2 Social Analysis of East Maitland

East Maitland is located within the Maitland City Council Local Government Area. Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics shows East Maitland has a population of 11,860 residents in a land area of 15.94 square km.

Household Types and Size

The largest household type are Households without Children at 39% (NSW 37.9%) followed by Households with Children at 38.4% (NSW 44.7%) and one parent households at 20.8% (NSW 15.8%).In East Maitland, the most dominant household size is currently 2.3 persons.

Dwelling Types

74.5% of dwellings in East Maitland are single detached dwellings on separate lots. 17.4% are semi-detached, terrace and townhomes above the NSW average of 11.7%. The proposed development scale complements the area as it is a townhouse/ villa typology. Most dwellings have three bedrooms at 41.6% (34.7% NSW), followed by 29.9% having 4 or more bedrooms. The proposed development is predominately one-bedroom, supported by two, two-bedroom units. The number of bedrooms is consistent with the proposed residents, which will be single individuals or small family groups escaping domestic violence.

Car usage and travel to work

Car ownership is predominately one car (38%), closely followed by two cars (34.9%). At present, the use of public transport is low at 0.4%, despite its proximity to two train stations and convenient access to Newcastle CBD. Work travel is predominately by car as a driver (56.6%). 18.7% of residents worked from home, below the NSW average of 31%. The census was held during COVID, and it is likely people worked from home as a requirement. Therefore, the rate is likely lower due to the nature of the occupations, which include tech and trade workers, clerical and admin workers and community and personal service workers.

Language

The ability to speak English (as well as another language) ranks high. This is an important factor when signage is relied upon for CPTED solutions. Signage considerations will also be important to future proof the development should demographics change in the future. However, it is not known where residents are arriving from and may need language assistance.



Figure 3: East Maitland Land Zoning Map (Spatialviewer 2024)
The site is within R2 Low Density Residential. The East Maitland village centre is situated to the north within the E1 Local Neighbourhood Centre zone.

3 THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT

The proposed group home forms part of the Housing Plus "Core and Cluster" domestic and family violence program, providing a safe haven for women and children escaping and recovering from domestic violence. Housing Plus is a Tier 1 community housing provider which provides affordable housing, homelessness services, domestic and family violence service, post-release services, home modifications, employment pathways and other innovative services.

The "Core and Cluster" model represents an innovative approach to accommodating women and children seeking refuge from domestic violence, aiming to elevate the standard of available accommodation. Traditionally, such refuge was provided through shared-house arrangement, where residents shared all facilities except bedrooms. In contrast, the "Core and Cluster" model enhances this by offering self-contained living quarters for each resident, complete with private kitchen and bathroom amenities. Despite this autonomy, the model maintains a cohesive household structure.

In this model, self-contained living quarters, known as the 'Cluster,' are situated in proximity to communal facilities, termed the 'Core.' These Core facilities offer access to vital services like counselling, legal aid, and support for education and employment, along with shared communal spaces.

At its core, the philosophy of the "Core and Cluster" model is to provide residents with immediate access to essential support services while affording them personal space and necessary amenities to effectively address personal challenges and trauma.

3.1 The proposed development

The development site comprises a single lot with a single street address to Park Street. The lot has seven adjoining lots that will share a boundary with the subject site.

3.1.1 Site and Building arrangement

The site is located on the bend of Park Street, with a wide setback between the street and the boundary. The front setback, between the boundary and the proposed development, is a natural gully constrained by flooding. This required elevated parts of the building and carpark to allow for flood storage during a flood event.

The nature of the development, as a refuge for victims of domestic violence, means that Surveillance, Access Control, Territorial Reinforcement and Space and Activity Management are of vital importance, particularly for the front setback and the undercroft. Natural Surveillance will be challenging and will be heavily reliant on CCTV. Access Control must be a combination of actual and perceived access control. A fence and gate have been proposed to secure the front setback and the development. Details are provided under Section 6 Surveillance, Section 9 Activity and Space Management, and Section 10 Access Control.

Table 1: Development Summary
Core
One (1) Core Admin space. One (1) Core Communal
Cluster
Eight (8) units comprising: • 6 x 1 bedroom units (one is accessible). • 2 x 2 bedroom units (both located on the first floor).
Communal Open Space: **Active Play and Functional Outdoor Spaces**
Play area located behind the units and communal dining comprising: • Children's play area. • Yarning Circle. • Communal courtyard. Functional Outdoor Spaces • Drying area. • Bin areas. • Storage room.
Carpark
The carpark is between the driveway and the units, comprising: • Six (6) parking spaces (one accessible space).

The development comprises a main building containing the Core and three units and three separate smaller buildings containing the remaining five (5) units.

3.1.2 Core and Cluster

Core
The Core is composed of two parts.

The Core Admin is located in the main building. It has an entry directly from the carpark. It contains a reception area, two consulting rooms, a conference room office, kitchenette, accessible toilet and another toilet.

The Core Communal is also in the main building. It contains a lounge, communal dining space, communal kitchen, and kids area. It is located on the ground floor and has direct access to the outdoor open space and play area. A small laundry is located off the Core Communal but is accessible externally via the communal open space.

Cluster
Eight units are proposed in total. Three are located within the main building, one on the ground floor and two on the first floor. The ground floor unit has independent access from the driveway. The first floor units have access from the shared Core entry which provides access not only to the first floor units but to the ground floor Core Communal.

Communal Open Space
A communal open space is proposed between the main building and Cluster. The space includes a range of active and passive activities:

<u>Active</u>
- Children's Playspace

<u>Passive</u>
- Yarning Circle
- Communal Courtyard with seating

<u>Functional</u>
- Drying area.
- Bin areas.

Carpark
The carpark provides six parking spaces including one accessible parking space. The entry to Core Admin is directly from the carpark. It acts as an arrival point. Unit 1 is also accessible directly from the carpark along with a separate access to the Core Communal and the first floor units.

Control of the driveway entry is from Core Admin. Access to the carpark is secured by a gate and a fence which controls access to the front setback and the undercroft of the carpark and building.



Figure 4: Site plan of the proposed development (HousingPlus 2024)



Figure 5: Site sections through the proposed development (HousingPlus 2024)

4 CRIME RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

4.1 Crime Prevention Assessment Site & Building Analysis

Site analysis helps in the understanding of a place – how the built form, landform and local user groups can increase or decrease criminal activity.

The following diagrams are a visual representation of the Crime Risk Assessment (CRA) undertaken for this project. The outcomes of this analysis are incorporated into the Assessments and Recommendations provided in Sections 5 – 12.

4.1.1 Context Analysis



Figure 5: Summary Crime Prevention Assessment - Context Analysis (ArcGIS / TDP 2024).

The subject site is located within East Maitland, west of the New England Highway, the train line and East Maitland and Victoria Street Station.

The New England Highway is a major movement corridor lined with a mix of retail, commercial, and residential properties. The town centre is situated to the northeast and has a different character from the vehicular-dominated New England Highway. To the southwest of the site are a series of open spaces, including Cooks Square Park (1) and Stockade Hill Heritage Park (2). There is also a scout hall (3) opposite the site. Unless in use, these open spaces do not provide natural surveillance. Many of the neighbouring residential dwellings are unit typologies. However, many are insular developments that look internally opposed to the street. Where views to the street are available, vegetation inhibits views. A car dealership (3) is located on King Street and does not provide surveillance.

The site is currently vacant and a low fence defines its boundary.

Figure 6: The local context photos of the site and surrounds (TDP 2024)

1. The subject site is vacant land with residential on three boundaries.
2. Multi unit development to the east.
3. Duplex developemnt to the west.
4. Driveway from No.12 connecting to Park Street.
5. Multi unit developments on the left, concealed by trees.
6. Car dealership situated on the corner of Park St and King Street. The New England Highway is in the distance.
7. Scout Hall acroos the road from the developemnt.
8. Sporting building associasted with sports fields in Stockade Hill Heritage Park.

4.1.2 Ground Floor Analysis



Figure 7: Summary Crime Prevention Assessment - Ground Floor Plan (Housing Plus/TDP 2024).

- Core Admin and Core Communal
- Units
- Fence line to define boundary from street.
- Undercroft zone (approx). This zone is vulnerable as it has no sightlines and control from Core Admin. Could be used for concealment and entrapment. Design needs to reduce concealment opportunities in the undercroft.
- Path of travel which could be used to ram the building. Bollards or similar needed in the event a person obtains access through stealth or force.
- Entry points to the Core from carpark. This includes units with direct access from the carpark.
- Entry points to Cluster Units. from behind the second layer of security.
- Communal open space which includes children's playspace which is behind the second line of security.

1. Bin storage area could be used for concealment.
2. Gate in fence that secures access to the carpark and the development. Gate recommended to be secured by fob as pins can be observed from street. CCTV recommended in this location. Fence should not facilitate climbing around the gate onto the bridge.
3. Fence on boundary defines public from private. Fence should be secured under the bridge however, it should not create an area of concealment and entrapment.
4. Views of the street blocked by storage room. Bin enclosure adjacent is also a potential concealment space and will need CCTV and mirrors to monitor the space.
5. Side access to Cluster units and communal open space.
6. Access control proposed on northern side of the development.
7. Unit 1 has direct access to the carpark. Should visitors try and open the door while searching for the entry, it could cause distress to the resident.
8. Windows are large enough to facilitate climbing to obtain access or sneak out. Windows will have security screens to reduce access.

4.1.2 Building Analysis - First Floor



Figure 8: Summary Crime Prevention Assessment - First Floor Plan (Housing Plus/TDP 2024).

Sightlines over the street and carpark from Unit 2.

Signtlines over communal open space.

1 Two points of egress from the first floor in the event an unauthorised person gains access.



Figure 9: Fence location for front setback. (Housing Plus/TDP 2024).

4.2 Crime Prevention Assessment: Crime Data

Analysis of Crime Data has limitations that are important to consider when undertaking an assessment of a place and its proposed development.

The crime data that is available for the suburb will not specify if it relates specifically to the study area. However, hotspots can provide an indication if there is activity happening to a specific area. Hotspots are noted in Table 2 below and mapped in Figures 10 - 16.

It is also important to note additional limitations with regard to the reporting of crime, that the reporting of crime is influenced by a number of factors, including public understanding of what constitutes a crime and the public's willingness to report crime. (Weatherburn 2011).

Data used for crime assessments are from NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics (BOCSAR).

Crime Data Summary

The assessment of crime data was focused on activities that relate to the future operations.

For this development it includes, crimes relating to dwellings, vehicles and the public domain (crimes that could occur on the street or park). The East Maitland catchment is for the entire suburb, refer Figures 10 - 16. The summary below identifies the rates are n.c or not counted due to the low rates.

Crime Data Snapshot	Year to December 2022		Year to December 2023		Hotspot
Offence	East Maitland Rate per 100,000	NSW Rate per 100,000	East Maitland Rate per 100,000	NSW Rate per 100,000	yes/no n.c not counted
Assault: Non-Domestic Assault	**808.7 (96)**	385.1	**859 (102)**	422	No
Assault: Domestic Assault - up 54.7%	**539.1 (64)**	417.6	**834.0 (99)**	445.7	**Yes**
Theft: Break & Enter Dwelling - up 72.4%	**244.3 (29)**	232	**421.2 (50)**	246.8	**Yes**
Theft: Steal from Dwelling	**286.4 (34)**	187.6	**278.0 (33)**	196.4	**Yes**
Theft: Motor Vehicle Theft	**379.1 (45)**	151.9	**328.5 (39)**	176.5	**No - Edge**
Theft: Steal from Motor Vehicle - up 107.5%	**446.5 (53)**	335.8	**926.6 (110)**	358.7	**Yes**
Malicious Damage - Up 22.2%	**1288.9 (153)**	599.9	**1575.3 (187)**	609.1	**No - Edge**
Sexual Offences	**387.5 (46)**	214.3	**337 (40)**	214.8	n.c

Table 2 : Crime data snapshot
Data for Rates per 100,00 over a two year period for East Maitland - December 2022 and December 2023. The table shows that crime activities relating to non-domestic assault, domestic assault, vehicle theft and theft from vehicles, break and enter for dwellings, steal from dwellings, malicious damage and sexual offences. The development is within or on the edge of hotspots for Steal From Dwelling, Break and Enter Dwelling, Motor Vehicle Theft, Steal from Motor Vehicle, Malicious Damage.

BOCSAR Hotspot Mapping

A hotspot identifies crime density and is assigned a colour (red, orange or yellow) to reflect the strength of the hotspot. Hotspots are not adjusted to reflect the number of people living or visiting the location. This means they do not necessarily reflect areas with a higher than average risk of victimisation. This is why its important to refer to the actual counts of crimes in Table 1. However, hotspots can identify patterns, building or spatial typologies which are more affected.



Figure 10: Hotspot - Non-Domestic Assault (BOCSAR2024).
The Development is not within a Non-Domestic Assault hotspot.



Figure 11: Hotspot - Malicious Damage (BOCSAR2023).
The Development is on the edge of a Malicious Damage hotspot.



Figure 12: Hotspot - Steal from Dwelling (BOCSAR2024).
The Development is on the edge of a hotspot for Steal from Dwelling.



Figure 13: Hotspot - Break and Enter Dwelling (BOCSAR2024).
The Development is within a hotspot for Break and Enter Dwelling.



Figure 14: Hotspot - Motor Vehicle Theft (BOCSAR2023).
The Development is surrounded by a Steal from Motor Vehicle hotspot. Two of the hotspots are high density.



Figure 15: Hotspot - Steal from Motor Vehicle (BOCSAR2024).
The Development is within a hotspot for Steal from Motor Vehicle.

Summary of Findings.

Analysis of BOCSAR data for East Maitland considers potential risks that should be considered in the design and management of the development. These risks consider both the development as a 'residential' development and as a group home for women and children escaping and recovering from domestic violence.

Theft
Motor Vehicle Theft is above the NSW average and Steal from Vehicle is up 107.5%. The development is in a hotspot for Steal from Vehicle and surrounding by hotspots for Motor Vehicle Theft. The proposed development is setback from the street and will be secured by a gate and fence. The carpark is only accessible via a secure driveway. This reduces the opportunity for vehicle theft or theft from vehicles, despite the vehicles being outdoors. Beyond design advice that recommends good sight lines, limited concealment spaces, staff and residents are also warned not to leave valuables in their cars.

Assault
Rates for Non-domestic Assault is above the NSW average for both 2022 and 2023, however, the proposed development is not within a hotspot. As the development is contained and secured, there is a low risk of non-domestic assault on site. When residents leave the development and use public transport they may be a greater risk. Domestic Assault is recorded in the area and is up 54.7% in the two year period.

Sexual Assault is above the state average. There is no hotspot mapping for the site.

Malicious Damage
The development is at reduced risk of malicious damage such as graffiti and vandalism as it is setback from the street by a secure driveway. However, it could be at risk from residents, and the selection of materials that reduces the opportunity for graffiti and damage is recommended.

Perceptions
CPTED considers both actual crime and perceptions of crime. The residents who will live in this development will be escaping or recovering from domestic violence. Fear is a large part of that lived experience and it is important that the design does not increase fear. For instance, landscaped areas that could be 'perceived' to conceal the person they have fled from. This is created by actual concealment spaces, but also those created by shadows at night. The following recommendations consider both the actual risk from the public and abusive partners/ family as well as the fears that could be perceived in the development.

Ongoing management and liaison with local police will need to monitor any new hotspots that may arise in or around the proposed development due the new uses.

It's important to note that the existing crime data cannot predict the future and the dynamics of the future population. Therefore, designs should consider that new anti social and criminal activity could take place in this area in the future. This requires resilient design approaches. Crime activity can change from year to year. This may not be because the activity has increased, but because activity is reported inconsistently or because Police are targeting that particular crime activity.

5 SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance is a core element of CPTED. There are three types of surveillance - Natural, Technical and Formal. The concept of surveillance seeks to discourage anti-social behaviour by creating an environment where people can see and interact with others. When people feel they are being watched, they are less likely to commit a crime.

Surveillance is achieved through well considered urban design, careful selection of landscaping solutions and lighting. This can create a safer environment. Successful surveillance outcomes are the product of good design.

5.1 Assessment

At this stage, detailed designs have not been prepared. This assessment and the following recommendations provide guidance for the future development of the site.

5.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

The subject site comprises a single lot with frontage to Park Street. The lot falls to Park Street, which makes the site highly visible.

To the north, east, and south, there are existing dwellings in a mix of units and single dwellings. To the southwest is Cooks Square Park and a Scout Hall. These uses do not provide natural surveillance unless they are in use. Regardless, natural surveillance is limited due to the topography and vegetation.

Figure 16: Vacant site
The site is currently vacant. (TDP2024).

5.1.2 Proposed Design Assessment

The development proposes two components comprising the Core and Cluster.

Core
The Core comprises administrative and communal uses. The Core has control of the site. Within the Core Admin is a reception area, which has views over the carpark and Park Street. However, the sightlines are not as strong over Park Street due to the setback and the need for a boundary fence. Core Communal does not have sightlines over the carpark and is oriented towards the communal outdoor area. Within the Core building are three units, which are discussed below.

Cluster
The Cluster is composed of seven units. Five are situated behind the Core Building. These units have a living space that opens onto a private terrace. Units 4 and 5 overlook the communal outdoor areas. The remaining three units are located within the Core Building, one on the ground floor and two on the first floor. Units 1 and 2 overlook Park Street. However, the ground floor unit has more limited openings to maintain privacy, and it is likely that these windows will be concealed with window coverings.

The communal open space is situated between the Core Building and the cluster units at the rear of the site. Core Communal, as do Units 4

and 5, has natural sightlines over the communal space. This outdoor space is a shared area that provides playspaces for children and areas to sit.

A yarning circle is located on the northern setback. Windows from Core Communal can overlook the space and provide natural surveillance.

Front setback

The front setback has flooding constraints that limit development. As a result, the carpark and parts of the Core Building are elevated. This elevation creates an undercroft with no surveillance from the proposed development's staff and residents. While part of the solution is to secure the front boundary, the space could act as a concealment area should a person gain unlawful entry. No landscaping is proposed in the front setback due to potential impact on flooding. This is helpful as it will not provide landscaping that can facilitate concealment. Measures to discourage its use and improve surveillance are recommended.

5.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations could improve natural surveillance for the development. The goal is to allow the Core's management to have visual control over the development and to minimise opportunities where people can hide and monitor the development and potentially assault or kidnap residents.

5.2.1 Natural Surveillance and Sight lines

Ensuring optimal sight lines serves multiple purposes: empowering management and residents with visual oversight of the development while also promoting a sense of surveillance to discourage unwanted activities. Table 3 serves as a helpful



Figure 17: Example of impacted sight lines.
(top) Sight lines can be achieved by keeping shrubs low and ensuring the lower limbs of trees are above head height. This reduces opportunities for concealment. It allows for people to have good distant sight lines and recognise a person from a distance.
(bottom) Where landscaping is proposed adjacent to a path, the vegetation is recommended to step down to the path to broaden the view corridor.

Table 3: Sight lines	
1.	Boundary Fencing A 1.8 metres high palisade fence is proposed along the front setback. The fence secures both the boundary and the driveway. Ensure Core Admin retains sight lines to Park Street through the fence. While a black fence facilitates stronger sightlines, a white fence also facilities sightlines but increases privacy from the street to the development.
2.	Treatment of the Undercroft Dark undercroft spaces can increase concealment. Paint the columns and ceiling white and line the ground plane with light coloured material. Do not use the undercroft for storage as these items could be used for concealment. CCTV could be installed either in the undercroft (must be waterproof) or positioned to look back to the undercroft. Motion sensors are recommended. A CCTV screen is recommended in reception and on mobile phones of staff so that CCTV is actively monitored. Refer to Section 6 for general CCTV recommendations.
2.	Core Admin Entry Viewlines Ensure sight lines from Core Admin reception are unobstructed by landscaping, such as the two trees proposed outside the reception area. Cars or trucks should not be parked on the driveway or aisle as they can block sight lines. All cars must be parked in parking spaces
3.	Core Admin Window Treatments The application of decals, signage and posters on Core Admin glazing should be minimised so as not to obstruct sight lines.
4.	Core Admin Fixtures Seating, shelving and other internal built elements within Core Admin are encouraged to remain low or incorporate transparent elements to facilitate views. This allows for surveillance of the carpark, and external outdoor spaces. Use mirrors to monitor blind spots.
5.	Landscaping for Sight lines Design and maintain landscaping to preserve sight lines between building entries, driveway entry and carpark. Similarly, preserve sight lines within the communal open space. Refer to Table 5.

5.2.2 Vegetation and Landscaping

Thoughtful design and strategic placement of trees and landscaping can significantly enhance the appeal and safety of a development, aligning with CPTED principles. Conversely, neglecting these principles during design, installation, and maintenance may inadvertently elevate the risk of crime within the area.

Table 4 is a guide to assist with the planning, design and long term care of the landscape spaces.

Table 4: Vegetation and landscaping	
1.	View lines The creation of pockets which facilitate concealment should also be avoided by consistent planting and replacing dead plants which can result in gaps.
2.	Use taller species adjacent fences and walls and groundcovers adjacent footpaths/carpark. Landscaping should step down to broaden the view corridor. Select species that require minimal maintenance.
3.	Keep species within the view corridor between Core Admin and driveway no higher than 300-500mm. Trees are suitable in this location so long as lower tree limbs are above average head height. The same rule applies to trees in the rest of the development.
4.	Shadows Shadowy areas form when trees obstruct the illumination from light poles and internal lighting. It's crucial to carefully plan the placement of both lighting fixtures and trees to prevent the obstruction of light. Shadowy spaces not only offer hiding spots but also instil fear in residents who might perceive them as potential hiding spots for individuals waiting to cause harm.
5.	Lighting Design Future advice on lighting design, in conjunction with the landscape design (during the construction documentation and construction phase) is recommended. This may include modelling of proposed lighting in conjunction with landscaping to test light spill and shadows.
6.	Inspect vegetation Undertake a regular review of the vegetation and landscaping to ensure that it has not grown to create new or re-establish former spaces of concealment and entrapment.

5.2.3 Places of Concealment and Entrapment

Opportunities for concealment and entrapment can manifest both in semi-private and private spaces. These areas, conducive to hiding or trapping individuals, often arise from specific design choices or the unchecked growth of vegetation due to inadequate maintenance.

Table 5 is a guide to assist with the planning, design and long term care of buildings and landscape.

Table 5: Places of concealment and entrapment	
1.	Refer to Table 3 Item 2 for recommendations regarding the undercroft which could provide a concealment space e.g. for a space to wait and monitor before breaking into the development.
2.	Refer to recommendations Table 4 Item 2 on the method to design, install and maintain landscaping, particularly around the rear cluster units.
3.	During this project's briefing, the Applicant advised that no landscaping is proposed in the front setback and that turf would be limited due to flood constraints. This assists the development as it does not provide concealment areas that landscaping can create. Should this change in the future, the landscape design, maintenance manual and installation should be checked by a CPTED consultant to ensure that low-growing species are selected and placed so as not to create concealment spaces. Turf should be regularly mown.



Figure 18: Concealment spaces
Concealment spaces can be the result of plant die off and needs to be monitored and dead plants replaced. They can also be created by inconsistent planting.

6 LIGHTING & TECHNICAL SUPERVISION

Lighting and Technical Supervision refers to the role that lighting and products such as CCTV have in improving safety in the public domain. Many public spaces have lighting however, the specified products are often inappropriate, or are not wisely located. Often lighting creates new issues, as poorly located lighting can create shadows that previously didn't exist. Likewise, CCTV can often be a waste of money if there is low risk of crime, is poorly located or if no one is monitoring the footage. The following assessment and recommendations identifies methods to use lighting and technical supervision to achieve the best outcome.

6.1 Assessment

At this stage detailed designs have not been prepared. This assessment and the following recommendations provide guidance for the future development of the site.

6.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

Existing lighting surrounding the development is identified as follows:

- Street lighting in Park Street.
- Street lighting in King Street.

6.1.2 Proposed Conditions Assessment

Lighting design has not been undertaken at this stage and will be further developed during the construction documentation phase.

In developments like this, where residents may be experiencing fear or are in a state of recovery, careful lighting design is paramount. It's imperative to ensure that lighting arrangements are carefully designed to eliminate shadowy areas that could provoke fear. This consideration extends beyond the design phase; ongoing maintenance of both lighting fixtures and landscaping is essential to prevent the emergence of new risks or fears.

The following recommendations can be used by the project architects and the consultant team to incorporate lighting and lighting enhancing features into their designs.

6.2 Recommendations

Table 6: Lighting Design	
1.	General • Ensure no shadowy spaces are created by the buildings, the gaps between the lights themselves and the landscape. The landscaping should not provide concealment opportunities created by shadows. Trees and landscaping can block lighting, forming shadows • Signage must be legible at night. • Lighting strategy and design is recommended to be undertaken by a qualified lighting engineer to test light spill and identify spaces of shadow and concealment. This may include modelling lighting in conjunction with landscaping.
2.	Lighting and CCTV • The carpark and pathways should have lighting which improves visibility and reduces fear. • Bollard lighting is discouraged as it's prone to vandalism and is less effective at illuminating faces. • All lighting should comply with relevant Australian Standards, particularly AS 1158. • Avoid using low-pressure sodium lamps. • Vandal-resistant lamps are recommended. • Avoid the use of coloured lighting • Lighting can lose up to 20% capacity within 12 months, resulting in inadequate light levels. This should be considered when selected lighting type and brightness. • CCTV is recommended particularly at the driveway entry, Core Admin entry, communal open space, waste area, internal pathways to rear cluster units, carpark, side setbacks, side fences looking towards undercroft. Position cameras to cover other cameras to reduce tampering. CCTV should be positioned so they are not easy to access, e.g. on a fence. • CCTV and lighting should be considered in tandem to ensure the lighting outputs are adequate for usable footage. • Monitor alcoves and deep recesses with CCTV. • Install sensor lighting and light timers.

7 TERRITORIAL REINFORCEMENT

Territorial Reinforcement recognises the importance of ownership of public spaces. Spaces that are well used and cared for are less likely to attract crime and anti-social behaviour. The role the community plays is often important to the success of the public space.

This principle seeks to remove the confusion from the public domain – to make the purpose of each space clear. This includes the definition of boundaries, function and operation of a space.

7.1 Assessment

At this stage detailed designs have not been prepared. This assessment and the following recommendations provide guidance for the future development of the site.

7.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

Currently, the site is vacant. The front boundary is fenced which locates the boundary and indicates the site is private. There are 1.8 metre high fences on the remaining three boundaries which separates the site from neighbouring land. At present there is good territorial reinforcement of the site.

7.1.2 Proposed Design Assessment

The development introduces three distinct spaces that facilitate control and management:

Area 1 Driveway and Carpark
The driveway is a bridge that links the development to Park Street. A fence and gate is proposed at the boundary to continue to reinforce the boundary and control access. The gate unmistakably signalling to visitors that they are entering private property.

The carpark serves as a semi-private area designated for residents and their visitors, as well as anticipated use by delivery and maintenance personnel. Importantly, this carpark is distinct from the private areas of the development, such as the communal open space. Both the northern and southern side setbacks are proposed to be secured to provide layering of security.

Area 2 Core
Core serves as a semi-private area primarily designated for the management of the development. In addition to staff, it will be utilised by residents, prospective residents, and service personnel. Conversely, the residential units are strictly private.

Area 3 Cluster
The Cluster encompasses private units, a private communal dining room, and a communal open space. Except for Units 1 - 3, access to the units is situated beyond the carpark facade, which serves as a security boundary, delineating the private domain from external access. Unit 1 and an entry stair to Units 2 and 3 have direct access to the carpark. The facade's design should make it clear that these are not the entrances to the building as confusion could cause distress for residents, e.g., visitors trying to open the door and scaring a resident.

Given the building's arrangement, it is recommended that Units 1 - 3 should house people who have progressed further in their recovery. Children are also not encouraged as there is direct access to the carpark, and potentially, access could be obtained to the undercroft areas.

7.2 Recommendations

Table 7: Territorial Reinforcement	
	General
1.	Lighting Lights in the ground can be used to reinforce paths of travel within the development, such as the entries to the units and the communal dining. Refer to Section 6 for detailed recommendations.
2.	Maintenance Maintenance of the development is a powerful tool in Territorial Reinforcement. A Maintenance Plan should form part of the Plan of Management. The Maintenance Plan should include the selection of durable materials and plant species that do not require extensive maintenance.
3.	Signage Clear signage should be installed throughout the development. Overuse of signage is not supported as it becomes less effective. Consistency of design will add to the overall sense of a cohesive community and sense of place. The street number should be clearly visible from the street and illuminated.
4.	Letterboxes Letterboxes are not proposed on site. The goal is to limit risk of identity theft and resident identification from letterboxes.
5.	<u>Construction Phase</u> Measures to secure the site during construction are required. A plan should be established prior to commencing construction. Actions include: • Store tools and building materials in strong rooms with tamper proof security systems.
	Specific
6.	Distinct zones Maintain the three distinct zones of the development - driveway/carpark, Core and Cluster. Reinforce the three zones through Access Control, refer Section 10.
7.	Ensure the entry to Core Admin is visually distinct from the Unit entries to avoid confusion. Visitors trying to open Unit 1's door could generate fear for the resident. Directional signage to Core Admin entry is recommended.
8.	A small gate and fence is proposed in the porch of Unit 1 to improve the perception that it is private. While unlikely, should the opportunity to increase the size of the porch become available it is recommended as it is a small space and this will assist with territorial reinforcement.

8 ENVIRONMENTAL MAINTENANCE

Environmental Maintenance is the maintenance and management of physical assets. This takes place during the operational stage of the Precinct. The assessment and recommendations provided below are guidance for the current design process and for future management. Public spaces that are poorly maintained, damaged, vandalised, appear abandoned and full of rubbish are unlikely to attract positive user groups. These types of spaces show a lack of pride by the community. Well maintained spaces send a positive message and tells potential offenders that people are watching and using this space. It is a good deterrent. Good design can help with maintenance in the future.

8.1 Assessment

Environmental Maintenance will generally occur in the detailed design and operational stage however, there are opportunities to integrate solutions during the design phase which will assist in the management of the new development. The aim is to create a development that is easy to maintain.

8.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

At present, the site is vacant and is managed by the owner of the site.

8.1.2 Proposed Design Assessment

The proposed development offers a self-contained environment, detached from the street. Maintenance is of paramount importance as it fosters a sense of home and safety among residents, while also mitigating the risks associated with concealment and property damage

8.2 Recommendations

Regular maintenance will demonstrate to the residents and visitors that this development has a site guardian and is safe.

Table 8: Environmental Maintenance	
Design Stage	
1.	Avoid the use of porus materials in areas with the greatest risk of graffiti tagging. Use anti graffiti coatings in these locations.
2.	Select materials that are robust and durable. Materials/elements should not be easily removed.
3.	Provide rubbish bins in the communal open space and plan for regular removal to avoid build up of waste.
4.	Specify low maintenance and drought-resistant plant species.
5.	Specify plants that do not grow to create concealment spaces.
Management & Operational	
6.	Establish an Environmental Maintenance Plan as part of the Plan of Management which includes a reporting system that allows residents and visitors to quickly report damage
7.	Repair or replace broken or damaged furniture/bins/ signs quickly.
8.	Regulary mow the turf in the front setback.
9.	Keep the undercroft and under the bridge neat and tidy. Remove any wind driven rubbish and do not use as a storage space.
10.	Review the current trends in crime in the area with the local Police and regularly update Environmental Maintenance Plan

9 ACTIVITY & SPACE MANAGEMENT

Activity and Space Management identifies strategies to establish natural community control.
These strategies include:

- Formal supervision
- Control of the space
- Maintenance of the space.

Activity and Space Management has strong correlations to earlier sections of this report. For instance, poor Environmental Maintenance results in urban decay which sends a negative image. This section explores how to improve the management of the development which align with the other principles in this report.

9.1 Assessment

Activity and Space Management will generally occur in the operational stage however, there are opportunities to integrate solutions during the design phase which will assist in the management of the new development. The aim is to create opportunities for natural control.

9.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

The management of the subject site will change significantly following the construction of the group home. The new mix of residents, resident visitors and staff will require a higher level of Activity and Space Management.

9.1.2 Proposed Design Assessment

The proposed design will transform the vacant site into a group home catering to women, children, and the staff overseeing its operations. As outlined in the concept of Territorial Reinforcement, the development will feature a mix of semi-private and private spaces. Despite careful design considerations aimed at segregating various functions, areas of potential overlap still require management to safeguard the well-being of future residents. An example of this is the location of Units 1 -3, which can be accessed from the carpark, particularly Unit 1, as its front door is directly accessed from the carpark. This report has recommended additional measures to improve the management of the development. Furthermore, the Plan of Management must incorporate strategies to address CPTED principles in the day-to-day operations of the development.

9.2 Recommendations

The design should enforce clarity and control of land use - making it clear what is semi-private (where the visitors and delivery and waste personnel are permitted) and what is private (where residents and staff are permitted).

Table 9: Activity & Space Management	
Managing semi private & private space	
1.	Use different paving treatments between the different spaces within the development such as the carpark and driveway from the entry to the Core and communal open space.
2.	Clearly identify areas which are not accessible to visitors such as the storage shed and waste areas. However, be cautious of the over use of signage as it may become less effective.
3.	Use controlled access (pin or eqv.) to manage access to all entry points. Pins not recommeded for the front gate as the code maybe observed.
4.	The undercroft will require management through surveillance measures e.g. Regular inspection of the space, CCTV and maintenance. This process should be documented in the Plan of Management.
Plan of Management	
5.	Develop a Plan of Management that integrates CPTED guidelines for surveillance, access control, hours of operation and maintenance recommendations. Review the current trends in crime in the area with the local Police and regularly update Plan of Management.
6.	Establish a Maintenance Plan, forming part of the Plan of Management, that ensures the site remains clean and well maintained. The plan should include routines for rubbish removal, repair of lighting and furniture and the maintenance of landscaping.

10 ACCESS CONTROL

Access Control identifies methods to manage access to and within a site. Methods may range from site restrictions, through to helping people leave a site safely.
Three methods are generally used: Natural Control, Technical or Mechanical Control and/or Formal Access Control. Natural Control Solutions seek to restrict and channel people into specific areas. Restrictions/ channelling can be a good deterrent for criminals as it increases the risk of being caught.
Methods are typically Natural Control solutions which may include:

- Landscape site planning such as fencing, water features, paths and vegetation
- Building site planning
- Wayfinding signage
- Control of lines of sight

Technical or Mechanical Control Solutions may include the use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) equipment. Lastly, Formal Access Control solutions would be the use of security officers.

10.1 Assessment

Access Control is determined during the design and operational stage which will assist in the management of the development.

10.1.1 Existing Conditions Assessment

At present, the site is vacant and there is no access control.

10.1.2 Proposed Design Assessment

The development proposes layered security, which commences at the street and partially separates the Core from the Cluster.

Front Boundary Control
The development is accessed from the carpark. Access will be controlled at the door via a swipe card or pin. Rear doors open from consulting rooms into the communal open space, which allows residents to visit the Core without using the carpark. This is essential for residents' privacy. Consulting room doors should be secured by a pin or swipe card.

The development is secured with a fence, vehicular, and pedestrian gate at the driveway entry. As the driveway is a bridge, the underside of the bridge is also secured to prevent access into the development. Both gates are recommended to be secured with a pin or swipe card. Side boundaries are secured by 1.8 metre high existing fences. There is a risk of ramming by cars driving at speed up the driveway into the Core building. A bollard is proposed which could assist in reducing the impact of such an attack. Other alternatives could also be considered such as a concrete seat or planter but would need to be designed by an engineer to mitigate the impact.

Core Admin and Communal Core
Access to Core Admin is via a single door that leads into a reception area. This door is proposed to be secured. This space has no access to Core Admin; however, each consulting room has direct access to the communal outdoor area and the southern side setback. This provides a second exit from the room during an emergency. Core Communal is shared by residents and is accessed by a door from the carpark and the communal open space. All entry points are capable of being secured. The internal door between Core Communal and the first floor stairs is also recommended to be secured with a fob/pin from the carpark side. This allows it to act as a fire egress but prevents unauthorised access. There is a secure side entry from the carpark to the communal open space on the southern side of the Core building. A fence is proposed to secure the northern side setback. The goal is to provide layers of security should a person gain access to the site.

10.2 Recommendations

Table 10: Access Control	
1.	Boundary Control As the design is developed ensure the front boundary remains secure with a 1.8 metre high fence and gates on the bridge for pedestrians and vehicles. Secure under the bridge where it is elevated above the ground plane. No areas of concealment should be created by the fence under the bridge.
2.	Secure the driveway gate with fob/swipe card, as pins can be observed from the street. Provide CCTV and video intercom to allow Core staff to communicate with visitors or delivery personnel.
3.	Building Facade Protection A bollard has been positioned in front of the entry to Core Admin to reduce the impact of a vehicle attempting to ram the building. Future engineering advice is recommended to ascertain the potential speed of a car accelerating along the driveway and the type of bollard needed to minimise or prevent damage to the building. An additional bollard may be required to the south of the proposed bollard as the tree is unlikely to be large enough. Another approach could be a concrete bench or planter however, this will need to be designed by an engineer to ensure it has suitable strength to withstand the impact of a vehicle.
4.	Core Admin Entry Secure the entry to the Core Admin entry with a pin or fob card. Provide CCTV and video intercom at door.
5.	Side Boundary Control Secure the pedestrian entry to the communal open space on the southern boundary with a pin or fob card. If the northern side boundary is to be used for access, secure with pin or fob card. Access should be limited to maintenance rather than use by residents as it could impact the privacy of Unit 1.
6.	Windows Fronting Carpark Limit the window opening of Unit 1 where it fronts the carpark, as the windows could be used to access the units or for 'sneaking out' e.g. a child 'running away' to find their parent.
7.	Internal Control Lock the internal door between Unit 1/First Floor entry and the communal room so that it still functions as fire exit but prevents access into the communal room.
8.	External Control Use door closers and alarms on doors to ensure doors are not left open. Use signage to warn people of risks in propping doors open which leaves rooms unsecured.
9.	Regularly review the Plan of Management to address issues as they arise.
	General
10.	All external door hinges to be mounted so they cannot be removed.
11.	Avoid creating natural ladders into the development from adjoining properties. The design of the building should not facilitate climbing to upper units.
12.	Windows require quality locks and unused windows must be closed and sealed permanently, particularly when in concealed locations. Windows and external doors to units will have security screens (Invisi-Gard or similar) Skylights to be secured. External windows and doors to be of solid construction.
13.	Construction sites to be secured and locked. Provide CCTV. Building materials stored in strong rooms, Security needs to be tamper proof.

11 3 D's : DESIGN/DEFINITION/DESIGNATION

It is important for the design, definition and definition of a public space to be in harmony. If a space comprises uses that conflict with another use, dangerous situations could arise. Offenders often exploit situations that are confusing.

This can be described as the three D's.

Designation
- What is the designated purpose of this space?
- What this its original purpose?
- How well does the space support its current or its intended use?
- Is there a conflict between its current and intended use?

Definition
- How is space defined?
- Who owns the space and is it clear?
- Where are its borders?
- Is the space defined by social or cultural factors – does this affect how space is used?
- Are the legal or administrative rules clearly set out and reinforced in policy?
- Are there signs?
- Is there conflict or confusion between designation and definition?

Design
- Does the physical design support the intended function?
- Does the physical design support the desired or accepted behaviour?
- Does the physical design conflict with proper functioning of the space?
- Is there confusion or conflict in the physical design which is intended to control behaviour?

11.1 Assessment

One of the challenges of this development is the undercroft below the carpark and the location of units in front of Core Admin, e.g. directly accessible from the carpark. This creates some conflict that pulls the 3Ds out of alignment. However, if the recommendations in previous sections are carried out, they will assist in improving the development's management. Still, it will require ongoing close management to ensure the undercroft poses no risks and that residents in Units 1, 2, and 3 are not impacted by visitors or unauthorised visitors.

11.2 Recommendations

- Undertake a 3 D's assessment regularly.
- Implement recommendations from Sections 5 – 11.

12 CONCLUSION

The proposed development will change the site's current use - from a vacant lot part of a new subdivision, to a group home for women and children escaping or recovering from domestic violence.

Analysis of BOCSAR data for the locality identifies several hotspots on the site and close by. While physical threats to residents and the building are a key consideration, perceptions of threats and fear must also be addressed. While residents may be physically safe in the new group home, fears for theirs and their children's safety could manifest in the development. Particularly areas in the communal open space and around Units 4 - 8 which have lots of landscaping and small enclosures which at night could result in shadows. The recommendations are based on layers of security. This means the analysis has considered the security of the group home if in the event a person gets through the security gate at the street, whether by force or stealth.

This review has also provided recommendations that can assist in preparing the Plan of Management and the future management of the development.

The documentation is at a Development Application level. Therefore, many specific details are yet to be fully established and will be documented during future stages. However, this report endeavours to provide recommendations to guide the plans for future design development to ensure the development is set in the right direction. The key recommendations address all principles, including Surveillance (including Lighting), Territorial Reinforcement, Environmental Maintenance, Activity and Space Management and Access Control. The proposed design has the opportunity to provide women and their children a safe place to recover and rebuild their lives.

A high level of consistent maintenance and the delivery of high quality finishes will demonstrate to residents and visitors that this is a well loved development - showing there is guardianship over the development. Therefore, it is essential that there is a strong visible presence of people and the limiting of opportunities for criminal behaviour so there is no perception of vulnerability which could turn this site into a target. Consultation with local area police is highly recommended to monitor the area and the proposed development.

12.2 Key Recommendations

The recommendations and guidelines from the CPTED principles in Section 5 - 11 should be used to guide the construction certificate phase and management of the development.

The following are the key recommendations and ongoing considerations. This summary must be read in context with each section of this report and the supporting analysis, which provides the full range of recommendations for the project.

Boundary Fencing
Controlling the street boundary is an effective method to maintain territorial reinforcement and access control. It signals to the public this is a private development. This is further reinforced by the proposed secure gate and the securing of under the bridge. As the design is developed the following is recommended:

- Ensure that climbing around the gate is not feasible by using the boundary fence as a ladder or ledge.
- Consider a white or lighter coloured fence which still permits sightlines but improves privacy when viewing the development from the street.
- Ensure any lighting at the entry provides good visibility for CCTV and visual intercom. Do not position CCTV where it could accessible.
- Regularly clear any rubbish or plants that can collected at the base of the fence or under the bridge as these could provide concealment.

Treatment of the Undercroft and front setback
The proposed undercroft is the result of the flooding constraint; however, it needs to be well-designed and managed. Dark undercroft spaces can increase concealment. The front setback is anticipated to flood occasionally, and vegetation is not permitted beyond turf. This is beneficial as there will be no landscaping that could provide concealment. As the design is developed, the following is recommended:

- Paint the columns and ceiling of the undercroft white.
- Use a light coloured material on the floor of the undercroft to increase visibility.
- Do not use the undercroft for storage as these items could be used for concealment.
- Regularly mow the lawn to maintain a neat appearance and ensure the edges where the lawn adjoins the undercroft do not contribute to view loss.
- Provide CCTV in the undercroft or in a location with views to the undercroft from multiple angles. Use cameras to monitor other cameras to reduce tampering.
- Regularly monitor the undercroft for rubbish or weed accumulation which could create concealment opportunities.
- Incorporate the above into the Plan of Management and Maintenance Plan.

Maintaining Visual Control and protecting Core Admin

Core Admin is in control of the development and needs good sight lines and access to CCTV to do so. As the design is developed the following is recommended:

- Ensure sight lines from Core Admin reception are unobstructed by landscaping, such as the two trees proposed outside the reception area.
- Cars or trucks should not be parked on the driveway or aisle as they can block sight lines. All cars must be parked in parking spaces.
- Locate a CCTV screen in Core Admin reception and provide access via mobile phones for staff.
- Windows and doors should not been concealed by decals, signage and posters. Place those items on the wall.
- Obtain engineering advice on the possible speed of a vehicle driving at speed to ram Core Admin to determine the appropriate size and anchoring of the bollard or concrete planter / seat.

Protecting the Units
Unit 1 has direct access from the carpark. This unit is vulnerable as it is not behind the second layer of

security. Residents may be disturbed by a visitor trying to open the door if they become confused about which is the entry to Core Admin reception. While a small fence and gate have been proposed to provide territorial reinforcement, the porch area could benefit from being increased in size if there is an opportunity to do so however, it is recognised there is limited space.

Landscape

The landscape design proposes an communal open space that can provide good private amenity for residents and staff. Good landscaping assists with wellbeing; however, if not consistent with CPTED principles can create negative perceptions and management issues. In summary the following is recommended to be further considered:

- Ensure landscaping steps down to pathways and decks. Plants in the garden bed opposite Core Admin reception should be limited to 300-500mm in mature height and trees have clear limbs to adult head height.
- Test shadows created in the landscape by trees, lighting and buildings and the gaps between the buildings. The pathway between units and the Core Admin should not have shadowy spaces in the adjacent spaces at night which could create fear.

Please refer to Section 5 - 11 for detailed recommendations.

13 REFERENCES

Australian Institute of Criminology, What Australians Think About Crime and Justice: Results from the 2007

Survey of Social Attitudes, 2009

NSW Attorney General's Department, NSW Government Policy Statement and Guidelines for the Establishment and Implementation of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) in Public Places, 2000

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NSW Police Force, Park Security Assessment, 2007

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NSW Police Force, Safer by Design Evaluation Version 2.0, 2012

NSW Police Force, Safer by Design Manual Version 3.0, 2012

APPENDIX A - DESIGN DRAWINGS



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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

Site Plan

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

1:250 dwg scale @ A3

29/04/2024 printed date:

4 drawing No.



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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

Proposed Ground Floor Layout

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

1:200 dwg scale @ A3

6 drawing No.



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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

Proposed Upper Floor Layout

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
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A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

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drawing No. **7**



North-west Elevation



South-east Elevation

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client details:

Site Elevations

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

1:200 dwg scale @ A3

drawing No. 12

Core Building SW (front) elevation



South-west site SW (front) elevation

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

Elevations 2

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
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A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

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29/04/2024
printed date:

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drawing No.



Core - north-east elevation



accessible unit - north-east elevation

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**
client details:

Elevations 3
drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
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A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type
drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.
printed date: 29/04/2024

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drawing No.



North-east Elevation



South-west elevation of studio & 1-bed units

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client details:

Elevations 4
drawing title

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A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type
drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.
printed date: 29/04/2024

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

accessible unit SW elevation

indicative external finishes


face brick

scyon AXON

block retaining walls



Easy Lap panel

colorbond-surfmist

colorbond-dune



natural white

Colorbond Trimdek_roof

natural anodised aluminium window


aluminium balustrade

HardieDeck


front fence


perforated metal screen

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**
client details:

Elevations 5
drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type
drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.
printed date: 29/04/2024

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dwg scale @ A3

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drawing No.



Long Section A



Long Section B

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

site sections

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
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A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

1:200
dwg scale @ A3

drawing No. 17

birdseye view from north

birdseye view from north-east



birdseye view from north-west

Note: existing or proposed 1.8m high perimeter fences not shown (for clarity) in these views

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

3D views 1

drawing title

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

dwg scale @ A3

drawing No. 18



front setback area and site entrance

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Project: **Proposed Group Home & Community Facility at 10A Park St East Maitland 2323**

client details:

drawing title: **site entrance and CPTED**

issue	date	amendment description	##	by
B	14/02/24	updated DA set, recent amendments clouded		
A	8/05/23	DA issue		

plan issue type

drawn: J.Burns

contract number

revision no.

printed date: 29/04/2024

dwg scale @ A3

drawing No. **SK**